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ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS APPEAL. 
A, The Orders Prior To The Order Of March 24, 2008 Were Not Final Orders. 
1. This issue was already determined by the trial court. 
The final two matters to be addressed by the Trial Court in this action were 
Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment, on the remaining causes of action in the 
Defendants' counterclaim, and the Defendant's motion for release of the lis pendens filed 
in this matter by the Plaintiff. At the hearing the Defendants abandoned their remaining 
causes of action and the court accordingly found the summary judgment moot. The 
Court did however address the motion for release of the lis pendens. 
The gist of the motion was that the court should order the plaintiff to remove the 
lis pendens because the time for appeal had lapsed. The trial court rejected this argument. 
It was the trial court's analysis and finding that the orders submitted by Judge 
Lewis did not constitute final orders. These were the orders dismissing the Complaint and 
the amended complaint. The court found that Judge Henriod's orders contained language 
which complied with Rule 54, excepting that Judge Henriod's rulings also explicitly 
stated they related only to those narrow matters in the Partial Summary Judgments. The 
trial court stated: 
"I think that there is, in reviewing the Kennecott decision, in looking at what goes 
into a proper 54 (b) determination, its - 1 don't wish to basically reevaluate the 
appropriateness of Judge Henriod's determination. I am willing to accept Judge 
Henriod's, you know, belief that those 54 (b) certifications were appropriate; but I 
did find myself a bit on the horns of a dilemma, because I do recall the 
representations, which really have not been contested, that Judge Henriod 
expressly indicated he was not re-determining the issues determined by Judge 
Lewis, which, by my analysis, is not a final order." 
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The trial court's analysis was directly on point. The failure of the prior orders, 
relating to the dismissal of the original complaint and amended compliant, make the 
subsequent orders, irrespective of how they are crafted and tailored, interlocutory and 
not final orders. 
2. Under Utah law the orders prior to 3/24/08 were not final orders. 
Utah Appellate Courts have developed a "final judgment rule" to define when a 
final judgment exists in a case. Loffredo v. Holt, 37 P.3d 1070, 1072 (Utah 2002). "The 
rule saves this court from having to deal with 'piecemeal appeals in the same litigation... 
For an order to constitute a final judgment, it must end the controversy between the 
litigants. In other words, to be considered a final order, the trial court's decision must 
dispose of the claims of all parties." Id. 
Judge Lewis' orders did not dispose of all the claims between the parties. Her first 
granted permission for the Plaintiff to amend the Complaint. Plaintiff did so. The second 
order addressed only the issues of the Complaint and did not address the claims contained 
in the Counterclaim. Again it is undisputed that the "order" failed to dispose of all of the 
claims or any of the parties. 
Clearly the 11/28/06 Order, of Judge Henriod, did not dispose of all claims of all 
parties. Two claims still had not been ruled on. The Order when entered did not cover 
all the claims in the case. The Judgment therefore failed to qualify under the "final 
judgment rule 
The final judgment rule is dispositive over when Appellate courts have 
jurisdiction. There are however three exceptions to the final judgment rule. "First non-
final judgments merit our review if the three requirements of rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure have been satisfied. Second, we have jurisdiction over interlocutory 
orders when a party obtains our permission under rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Finally we can entertain a non-final judgment if an appeal is permitted by 
statute." Id. at 1073. Of the three exceptions only one is potentially relevant here, that is 
Rule 54. 
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Rule 54 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more 
than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim, and/or when multiple parties are 
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but 
fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination by the 
court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for entry 
of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or 
other form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the 
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate 
the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision 
is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the 
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
Defendants have argued that the order entered November 28, 2006 is a "final 
order". This is not so. It is indisputable that there were two causes of action in 
Defendants Counterclaim which had not been ruled upon by the Court. The Order of 
November 28, 2006 accordingly can constitute a final order only if the other criterion of 
Rule 54 are met. 
Under the plain language of the Rule the "court may direct the entry of a final 
judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an 
express determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for entry of judgment. Judge Lewis's orders do not contain the required 
findings. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "strict compliance" with the requirements 
of the final judgment rule is necessary to preserve the interest of judicial economy. Id. 
The failure of the order or any subsequent order to make the requisite findings defeats the 
Defendants claims of finality. 
The court addressed this issue in detail in the case of Kennecott Corporation v. 
Utah State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1991). In Kennecott, the Court stated: 
In Pate, we described in different words the three requirements for proper 
certification under Rule 54(b): 
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First, there must be multiple claims for relief or multiple parties to the action. 
Second, the judgment appealed from must have been entered on an order that 
would be appeal able but for the fact that other claims or parties remain in the 
action. Third, the trial court, in its discretion, must make a determination that 
"there is no just reason for delay" of the appeal. 
Kennecott at 1101. 
As stated by the Utah Supreme Court all three criteria must be met to create a final 
order. The first criteria are met because there are multiple parties to the action. The third 
criteria is not met by either of Judge Lewis Orders, but is met in the orders of Judge 
Henriod. The existence of the final order language does not make these orders final; 
however, because the claims which the Defendants are alleging are final are not separate 
from claims in the litigation that are not. 
In looking at this issue, the Court in Kennecott stated: 
The federal courts have taken two basic approaches to determining when a claim 
is separate and an order disposing of it is eligible for treatment as a "final" 
judgment and certification under Rule 54(b). The first is exemplified by the 
Seventh Circuit. It requires that before a claim can be considered separate, the 
facts underlying it must be different than those underlying other claims in the 
action. The Seventh Circuit takes the position that several legal theories based on 
one set of facts do not convert the theories into separate claims for purposes of 
rule 54 (b)... 
In determining the separateness of a claim, the Seventh Circuit "focuses on the 
degree of factual overlap between the issue certified for appeal and the issues 
remaining in the district court." When this factual overlap is such that separate 
claims appear to be based on the same operative facts or on the same operative 
facts with minor variations, they are held not to constitute separate claims for rule 
54(b) purposes. 
Kennecott at 1103. 
In Kennecott, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the Seventh Circuit approach as 
the standard in Utah. Kennecott at 1104. Examining the 11/15/06 order in light of that 
standard demonstrates the order fails to have been entered on a "separate claim". The 
orders dismissing the two claims on the original complaint and the order dismissing the 
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amended complaint do not purport to be final orders. The claims raised in those 
pleadings would constitute complete defenses to those items which were ruled in 
Defendants favor in the Order granting them Partial Summary Judgment. All of the facts 
underlying the Complaint, the amended complaint and the Defendants claims in their 
counterclaim are the same. Like the facts in Kennecott, the factual overlap between the 
ostensible separate claims is total. This is likewise true with respect to the two remaining 
claims which was the subject of Plaintiff s Summary Judgment Motion, and which this 
court denied as part of this hearing. Because the claims are not separate, there could be no 
final order until all claims are disposed of and any putative claim of finality is therefore 
invalid. 
B. Plaintiff Was Not Required To Appeal The 3/24/08 Order In Ten Days. 
Defendants claim that because they were entitled to have judgment entered this in 
some fashion required the Plaintiff to file his appeal within ten days of the date the order 
could have been entered. This is not true. 
UCA §78B-6-811(2008) provides in pertinent part "If the proceeding is for 
unlawful detainer after default in the payment of the rent, execution upon the judgment 
shall be issued immediately after the entry of judgment. In all cases, the judgment may 
be issued and enforced immediately." The first sentence of this statute provides for 
execution "after" entry of judgment. The second sentence indicates the judgment "may" 
be issued immediately. Neither of these sentences states that an interlocutory order 
becomes final solely because it relates to a complaint in unlawful detainer. Furthermore 
nothing in the statute cited relates in any fashion to when the appeal of the order may be 
made. The issue raised by the Defendants here is whether the appeal is timely. 
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This leads to the Defendants citation to UCA §78B-6-813(2008). This section 
provides, in pertinent part, "Except as provided in Subsection (2), either party may, 
within ten days, appeal from the judgment rendered." Defendants argue that this 
provision bars appeal from the 3/24/08 order as the Notice of Appeal was not filed until 
4/17/08. The problem with the Defendants claim is that the case at issue involved 
multiple issues and claims for damages. Indeed, the claim for unlawful damages did not 
even exist at the time the original complaint was filed in this matter. 
This exact scenario has already been ruled on by the Utah Supreme Court in the 
case oi Fashions Four Corp. v. Fashion Place Assoc, 681 P.2d 830 (Utah 1984). In that 
case the Plaintiff had filed a complaint, including a claim for forcible entry and detainer 
among other causes against the Defendant, who filed a counterclaim alleging unlawful 
detainer amongst other causes of action. After entry of judgment in favor of the Plaintiff, 
the Defendants filed an appeal. The appeal was filed outside the ten day period 
prescribed by UCA 78-36-11 (the section was renumbered to UCA §78B-6-813 in 2008). 
The Plaintiff alleged the appellate court lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held: 
Fashions Four also claims that this Court is without jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
inasmuch as Fashion Place failed to file its appeal within ten days from the date of 
entry of judgment for forcible entry and detainer as required by U.C.A., 1953, 
§78-36-11. We first address this threshold issue. 
Fashions Four's verified complaint contained four causes of action, asking for 
treble damages for forcible entry and detainer under the first two causes of action, 
a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction under the third, and 
damages for breach of the lease under the fourth. Fashion Place filed its 
counterclaim, likewise containing four causes of action, asserting wrongful 
reoccupation by Fashions Four, asking declaratory relief in striking the temporary 
restraining order, as well as for an expedited trial setting....Consequently we are 
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compelled to conclude that the hybrid nature of plaintiff s action, containing 
additional declaratory and equitable causes, and of the defendant's counterclaim 
with similar causes, prevents §78-36-11 from controlling the time for appeal. 
Instead, the appeal is governed by Utah R. Civ. P. 73(a) and was therefore 
perfected in timely fashion." 
Fashion Four Corp. at 831-832. 
In the instant case the causes of action are even more disparate than those in the 
Fashions Four case. The correct time for filing the appeal is governed by the general 
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure which grants 30 days to file the appeal. 
That was done here. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT. 
A. The Amended Complaint Was Allowed By The Trial Court. 
Plaintiffs initial Complaint sought relief under three causes of action entitled 
Promissory Estoppel, Specific Performance and Unjust Enrichment. Defendants filed a 
motion to dismiss the complaint. A hearing was held on the motion, and the court 
indicated it was going to dismiss the Complaint, but invited the Plaintiff to amend the 
Complaint. The docket shows the following entry "re: hrg on 4/28/05, The Court 
dismisses the pla's claims for specific performance and promissory estoppel & permitting 
pla to amend his unjust enrichment claim or to add a new claim." R.171. 
The Plaintiff took the Court up on its offer and filed an amended complaint. The 
Amended Complaint Stated claims for Fraud in the Inducement, Specific Performance, 
and Unjust Enrichment. The Specific Performance argument contained an additional 
factual basis that was not present in the initial complaint. The trial court's order as 
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understood by counsel and as set forth in the docket entry provided not only for a 
restatement of the unjust enrichment claim, but also "to add a new claim." 
In their brief the Defendants are stating that a valid basis for dismissal of the 
amended complaint was that the amended complaint was denied because it exceeded the 
scope of the court's approval. As demonstrated by the docket sheet, the amendment did 
not go beyond what the Court had ordered. The Court appears to have addressed the 
issues of the amended complaint it simply came to the wrong conclusions. 
Defendants seem also to imply that the order granting the motion to dismiss was 
not appealed. This is not true. The Notice of Appeal specifically refers not only to the 
final judgment in this case, but to the interlocutory orders entered as well including the 
order dismissing the amended complaint. 
The trial court invited the Plaintiff to amend his complaint. He did so. There was 
no order entered denying that the amended complaint was filed and considered. Instead 
there was an order entered dismissing the Amended Complaint, on its merits. If the 
argument is now that parts of the amended complaint are not allowed, then such a denial 
would be a violation of the Plaintiffs due process rights. Such a ruling would be to 
restrict the Plaintiffs claims to one issue, and because issues only raised in the original 
complaint are lost when a subsequent amended complaint is filed, the trial court would in 
essence be denying the Plaintiff the opportunity to appeal his legitimate issues to this 
court 
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It is apparent from the nature and course of these proceedings that the Court 
allowed the amended appeal to be filed and considered and likewise it is clear that the 
decision to dismiss the amended complaint was in error. 
B. The Amended Complaint Set Forth The Necessary Facts And Elements. 
In their brief, Defendants fail to address the appropriate standard of review for a 
trial court deciding a motion to dismiss. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
challenges a plaintiffs entitlement to relief under the facts alleged or under any state of 
facts that could be proved to support the claim. Patterson v. American Fork City, 67 P.3d 
466 (Utah 2003). If there is any doubt about whether a claim should be dismissed for 
lack of factual basis, the issue should be resolved in favor of giving the party an 
opportunity to present its proof. Ho v. Jim's Enterprises, Inc., 29 P.3d 633 (Utah 2001). 
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court must construe the 
claims in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences in 
his favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991). 
Defendants argue in their brief that under their interpretation of the facts, the court 
could have found in their favor. The problem with this analysis is obvious, the trial court 
was not allowed to weight the facts, it was required to accept the facts as plead and the 
inferences there from in favor of the plaintiff. 
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1. The Amended Complaint set forth the elements of fraud in the inducement. 
Defendants don't argue that the Plaintiff failed to state the necessary elements for 
a claim of fraud in the inducement, instead they argue that the claims are barred for two 
reasons. 
The first stated reason for dismissal is the trial court's finding that "Truong could 
not reasonably rely on conflicting oral terms when he entered into the Lease agreeing that 
he did not rely upon prior understandings between the parties." R.744. This argument 
fails on two grounds. First this analysis requires the Court to make a factual 
determination that the reliance was unreasonable. This is an issue for the jury. If the trial 
court accepts the facts as plead and the inferences in the Plaintiffs favor, then the court 
must find that his reliance on the oral representation was reasonable. The trial court 
stood the standard of review on its head. 
The second stated reason is the integration clause contained in the lease. This very 
issue was addressed by the Utah Court of Appeals in Nielsen v. Hefferon, 1999 WL 
33244735 (Utah App. 11/4/1999). In that case the Court held: "Moreover, parole 
evidence is admissible to prove that a party was induced into a contract by fraud, despite 
a determination that a writing is an integrated contract." 
In addressing this issue the Court has also held " An integration clause may 
prevent enforcement of prior or contemporaneous agreements on the same subject, but 
"does not prevent proof of fraudulent representations by a party to the contract, or of 
illegality, accident, or mistake...Paper and ink possess no magic power to cause 
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statements of fact to be true when they are actually untrue." Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's 
Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507? 512 (Utah App. 1988). 
The trial court's ruling dismissing the fraud in the inducement claim is flawed 
both factually and legally and the order should be reversed. 
2. Plaintiffs Complaint set forth the facts and elements for a claim for specific 
performance. 
In their Brief, the Defendants completely ignore the argument set forth in 
Plaintiffs brief. Plaintiffs initial brief sets forth the facts and elements necessary to 
prove a claim for specific performance. The Defendants' sole defense is to cite to the 
trial court's finding that the terms of the option are unambiguous and that the only written 
notice of intent to exercise the option was made after the time to give such notice had 
lapsed. 
The problems with this argument are obvious. If this court has to accept the 
finding of the trial court, there is no point in having an appellate court. The entire reason 
an appeal is made is because the party appealing believes the trial court's ruling is in 
error. 
The argument also fails because the facts as plead and supported by Plaintiff show 
that a written notice of intent to exercise the option was made prior to the deadline. A 
determination that the letter was not sent or inadequate would involve a factual 
determination. 
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Finally the argument fails because the ruling does not address the equitable issues 
allowing exercise of the option. These equitable considerations are completely fact 
driven and under the standards of review, they must be inferred in Plaintiffs favor. 
3. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint sets forth the necessary facts and elements for 
a claim of unjust enrichment. 
Plaintiffs claims are plead in the alternative. It is undisputable that a claim for 
unjust enrichment does not survive a finding that there is a valid contract that governs the 
issue on which the unjust enrichment claim is made. Defendants rely solely on this one 
point of law to support the trial court's dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim. 
The Defendants ignore the fact that sufficient facts have been plead, that would 
result in all or part of the alleged contracts, at issue in this case, being found to be 
invalid. 
In Plaintiffs opening brief, Plaintiff showed how the provision relating to the 
leasehold improvement could be found to be an unenforceable liquidated damages clause. 
Plaintiff also demonstrated that Plaintiffs understanding of the terms and force and effect 
of the terms in the contract was different than that of the Defendants. Since a meeting of 
the minds is a necessary element in any contract, this factual question, if interpreted in 
Plaintiffs favor, would result in recovery for the Plaintiff. 
Neither of these arguments are addressed by Defendants. Under the appropriate 
standard of review these arguments alone are enough to justify the reversal of the trial 
court. 
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IIIL THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
In their Brief Defendants fail to address a single argument presented in Plaintiffs 
brief. Instead they rely on a conclusory statement by the trial court, which is both 
factually and legally erroneous (as set forth in Plaintiffs initial brief). They then state 
that because "Truong remained in the Leased Premises after termination of the Lease..." 
this is a violation of the unlawful detainer statute and therefore the trial court did not err. 
The problem with this argument is that it presupposes the Plaintiff did not have the 
other defenses which would provide for his ability to remain in the premises. These were 
the arguments made to the trial court and which were set forth in Plaintiffs initial brief. 
It can only be presumed that no response has been made because no valid countervailing 
argument exists. 
i y . HOLMES ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THEIR REQUESTED DAMAGES. 
In Section III. of Plaintiff s initial brief he sets forth the respective legal basis for 
modification of the amounts awarded to the Defendants. Sub parts A and B address the 
issue of the trebled rents. In sub part A Plaintiffs argument addresses the election of 
remedies and double recovery issues with respect to the awarded damages. In Sub part B 
Plaintiff examines the plain language of the statute and case law addressing that language 
to demonstrate the amounts awarded are excessive. Defendants' sole response is to state 
the unlawful detainer statute allows for the trebling of damages. This fails to address any 
of the issues raised in Plaintiffs brief. As demonstrated by those arguments this position 
is unSupportable as a matter of law. 
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Section III. C. of Plaintiff s initial brief addressed the award of prejudgment 
interest. Defendants again fail to address or refute Plaintiffs arguments that unlawful 
detainer damages are not subject to earning prejudgment interest. The remainder of the 
argument is simply that the interest damages will need to be recalculated if this court 
were to still award unlawful detainer damages, but were to reduce them as suggested by 
Plaintiff. 
Section III. D. addresses the issue of attorney fees. The "detail" provided by the 
Defendants was not provided until their reply to Plaintiffs objection. No opportunity 
was given for a more detailed written challenge. The initial submission failed to need the 
required standards for an award of fees. When the more detailed statements are 
examined they clearly contain fees which were not awardable. None of the specific 
objections set forth in the Plaintiffs brief were redacted or otherwise addressed by the 
trial court, and have not been supported or justified by Defendants in their brief here. 
Accordingly the attorney fees award should be vacated or reduced. 
CONCLUSION 
Jurisdiction is properly vested in this court for disposition of this appeal. Even a 
cursory examination of the facts as presented demonstrates that it was plain error for the 
trial court to dismiss the Plaintiffs Complaint and Amended Complaint in this matter. 
Because these factual findings create the essential underpinning for the summary 
judgment motion it too is fundamentally flawed. 
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Defendants have failed to even try to address the arguments set forth in Plaintiffs 
initial brief. From this failure it is readily discemable that no valid defenses exist. 
Plaintiff therefore respectfully requests that the orders dismissing their amended 
complaint and granting the Plaintiffs motions for partial summary judgment on their 
counterclaims be reversed and that this matter be returned to the court for further 
proceedings. 
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DATED THIS j[_ day of March, 2009 
Larson, Turner, Dalby & Ethington, L.C. 
^ 
Shawn D. Turner 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Steven W. Call 
RAY QUINNWY & NEBEKER PC 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
15 
